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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2008 Presidential election, President Barack Obama used
a variety of campaign tactics. The most well-known of these campaign
materials was the image created by Shepard Fairey of President Barack
Obama looking upward with a pensive expression on his face, depicted in
the colors of red, white, and blue, and captioned “HOPE.”1 The image was
made popular by blogs and internet sites, as individual supporters
downloaded the image to use at campaign events.2 Moreover, throughout
the campaign, this particular image was reproduced on websites and
paraphernalia such as buttons and posters.3
The success of the image has been widespread and long-lasting.4 At
* Publication Editor 2010-2011, Staff Writer 2009-2010, University of Dayton Law Review; J.D.
expected May 2011, University of Dayton School of Law; B.A. in History, summa cum laude, 2008,
Wittenberg University. I would like to thank Professor Tracy Reilly for encouraging me to take on this
topic and for providing me with advice and guidance throughout the entire writing process. I would also
like to thank my family for their continued support throughout my entire law school experience.
1
Hillel Italie, AP Alleges Copyright Infringement of Obama Image, BREITBART (Feb. 4, 2009,
06:56 p.m.), http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9652OD01&show_article=1&catnum=8.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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the close of the campaign, Fairey distributed approximately 250,000 to
300,000 posters.5 In February of 2009, Fairey’s work was featured in a
retrospective at the Institute of Contemporary Art in Boston.6 In addition, a
new work of Fairey’s, a collage based on the HOPE poster, was placed in
the permanent collection of the Smithsonian Institution’s National Portrait
Gallery in Washington.7
Shepard Fairey’s success, however, has also been short lived. Due
to the success of the image, people began questioning Fairey’s source of
inspiration. Fairey consistently stated that he was inspired by an image
found on the Internet.8 The photo that Fairey used as a reference for the
HOPE poster was taken by an Associated Press (A.P.) photographer,
Mannie Garcia, in 2006, at a Darfur event; the photo pictures both President
Barack Obama and George Clooney.9 Consequently, the A.P. now contests
Fairey’s use of the image in his HOPE poster.10 Ironically, the actual
ownership rights in this photo were initially under scrutiny, as Garcia argued
he owned the rights to the photo, not the A.P., because he never granted the
A.P. any rights to his photographs.11
The A.P. brought a suit against Fairey for copyright infringement,
based on its perceived ownership rights in the original, copyrighted
photograph.12 Fairey, on the other hand, contends that his use of the
photograph is protected by the doctrine of fair use, which is an affirmative
defense to copyright infringement.13 This Comment will explore the fair use
doctrine and its relation to the First Amendment, particularly examining
whether an original image should be afforded less protection when the fair
5

Seven McDonald, Yosi Sergant and the Art of Change: The Publicist Behind Shepard Fairey’s
Obama Hope Posters, L.A. WKLY. (Sept. 11, 2008), http://www.laweekly.com/2008-09-11/columns/
yosi-sergant-and-the-art-of-change-the-publicist-behind-shepard-fairey-39-s-obama-hope-posters/;
see
also Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 22, Fairey v. The Associated Press,
No. 09 Civ. 01123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009). Fairey reinvested the money the HOPE poster earned into a
media campaign and the image was available to download for free, so it is difficult to say just how
frequently Fairey’s image was used. McDonald, supra.
6
Randy Kennedy, Artist Sues the A.P. Over Obama Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at C1.
7
Id. In addition, the image was included in a New York Times book on the election and served as a
cover for an economic manifesto. Italie, supra note 1. Fairey created a similar work for the inaugural
committee. Id.
8
Kennedy, supra note 6.
9
Id.
10
Jonathan Melber, The AP Has No Case Against Shepard Fairey, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8,
2009, 10:36 p.m.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-melber/the-ap-hase-no-case-again_b_
165068.html.
11
Id.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor Mannie Garcia’s Motion to Intervene, Fairey
v. The Associated Press, No. 09 Civ 01123 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009). In August 2010, Garcia withdrew
from the lawsuit against the A.P., citing both personal and professional reasons. Randy Kennedy,
Photographer Withdraws Lawsuit in Shepard Fairey Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2010, 5:59 PM),
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/photographer-withdraws-lawsuit-in-shepard-fairey-case/.
Fairey was actually encouraged to make the image by the Obama campaign, and campaign officials have
remarked that they knew the image’s source was questionable. Italie, supra note 1.
12
Obama Poster Artist Seeks Declaration of Rights Against AP, 21 No. 2 ANDREWS ENT. INDUSTRY
LITIG. REP. 7 (2009).
13
Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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use defense is raised and the subject matter is a public official. Under the
current system of copyright protection, the First Amendment is not a
defense, leaving the relationship between copyright law and the First
Amendment in ambiguity. This Comment will argue that in order to
harmonize copyright law and the First Amendment, a limiting doctrine
found in First Amendment law (the distinction between public officials and
private individuals in defamation law) should be applied to a limiting
doctrine in copyright law (the fair use defense).
Thus, if this case is analyzed under the copyright system as it
currently exists, the major focus will be on Fairey’s work and the subtle
differences between it and the A.P. photograph,14 as it is not the actual
depiction that matters in an infringement suit, but rather the fact that a
second author took the work of the original author.15 Consequently,
President Obama’s presence, while certainly a factor, will likely not be
determinative. If Fairey had taken the image of George Clooney from that
same A.P. photograph and made a new work, the analysis would be the
same. Regardless of what image was taken, Fairey took an image without
permission from the original author and created his own work. Despite this
emphasis, perhaps President Obama’s presence in the image should be
analyzed in instances such as these.
Section II of this Comment examines the nature of copyright
protection, as codified in the United States Code. The underlying purpose
and driving force of copyright law, the requirements for copyright
protection, and what rights are given to a copyright owner will be discussed.
Furthermore, this section will provide a brief examination of the purpose or
justifications for the fair use doctrine, which is an affirmative defense to
copyright infringement that is used when a defendant claims his unlawful
use is fair through the use of statutory factors.
Section III of this Comment will examine the purpose behind the
First Amendment, particularly looking at the freedom of speech. This
section will also provide a brief overview of defamation law and its
relationship to the freedom of speech. Finally, this section will discuss the
differences between public officials, public figures, and private individuals,
and the level of protection each class of people receives under the First
Amendment.
Lastly, Section IV of this Comment will argue that a limiting
doctrine of the First Amendment—the status distinction found in defamation
law—should be applied to the limiting copyright doctrine of fair use. First,
this section briefly analyzes the current relationship between copyright law
14
Some of these changes included simplifying the image, straightening some of the lines, changing
the color scheme, and adding a campaign logo and banner. Melber, supra note 10.
15
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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and the First Amendment. Many have argued there are certain areas that
already incorporate First Amendment concerns, such as the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use defense. The fair use doctrine and the limiting
doctrine of actual malice serve essentially the same purposes: comment and
criticism. Thus, a logical conclusion follows that a second author who
claims fair use should be allowed more leeway when his subject matter is a
public official. Therefore, this section will conclude that the status of
copyrightable subject matter should be a factor in determining if an alleged
infringer is entitled to successfully defend copyright infringement with fair
use. The scope of this analysis will be limited to images of a public official
which are taken by a second author to create a new work.
II. BACKGROUND ON COPYRIGHT LAW
Although copyright law originated in England, the United States has
since become a major player in the overall regulation of copyright
protection.16 The U.S copyright system now draws its power from the
Constitution and the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”).17 Since its
inception, copyright law has evolved, adapting to advancing technology and
globalization.18 Thus, these changes allow copyright law to “confront[] the
realities of the continuously evolving modern networked world.”19
A. Basic Framework of Copyright Protection
Without a system of copyright protection, the public goods problem
would exist. The public goods problem encompasses the idea that while the
16

Copyright protection initially began in England as a tool for government censorship and press
control. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 19 (2d ed. 2006). England
also provided the first statutory authority for copyright protection with the Statute of Anne, enacted in
1710, “which granted an assignable right to authors to control the publication of their writings.” Id. at 20.
This statute was meant to facilitate progress and provided an author protection for a limited duration. Id.
at 21. Drawing on these principles, the first federally-enacted U.S. statute was passed in 1790, through a
directive from the Constitution. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF
IDEAS § OV-1 (2009). A narrow category of works was given protection in this statute, and an author
only received protection for twenty-eight years. Blake Covington Norvell, The Modern First Amendment
and Copyright Law, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 547, 563 (2009). A subsequent act was passed in 1909,
which was replaced with the current 1976 Act. NIMMER, supra.
17
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332.
18
See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 605-06 (discussing very briefly three technological
advances in the motion picture industry, home electronics industry, and computer software); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright
Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001) (providing a brief overview of the relationship between international
law and copyright law, as well as proposing changes to fill the gaps in this relationship).
19
COHEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 3. As one scholar has pointed out, “where Congress fails to act,
courts fill the void,” and this has allowed copyright law to deal with new technology. Matthew Sag, God
in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 381, 401-02 (2005). Through the use of legislative history, this scholar argued that
Congress was aware of how copyright law was disrupted by past technologies and knew it was not in a
position to account for every change to come. Id. at 402. The changes to a dynamic copyright law in
1976 marked Congress’s understanding that “any new copyright law would have to be broadly expressed
to allow it to respond dynamically to unforeseen events.” Id.
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cost of creating a copyrightable work is high, the cost of reproducing that
work is low.20 Because of this low reproduction cost, that work can be
recreated or used by anyone.21 While there are a variety of reasons for the
existence of copyright law, one justification for its existence is that it solves
the public goods problem, and this is the system that is used in the United
States.22 This theory of protection is exclusionary in nature.23
Because of this purpose—to solve the public goods problem—
copyright law serves a utilitarian, or economic, function.24 This function is
determined by the U.S. Constitution and the laws Congress enacts, as the
Constitution gives Congress the power to create intellectual property laws.
Known as the “Intellectual Property Clause,” Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,
states that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”25 In
essence, the Constitution, through the laws enacted by Congress, allows a
copyright owner to have a limited monopoly over his or her work. Thus, the
overall purpose of U.S. copyright law is to provide a limited monopoly to an
author (which serves as an incentive to create), while still allowing
incentives for progress in knowledge.26 This allows the public to access and
benefit from those works. Congress (and the courts) must play a balancing
act between rewarding the author (by providing control and money) and
facilitating access to creativity by the public (by allowing access and re-use
of material).27
Not every country follows this economically-driven system of
copyright protection. A notable contrasting theory of protection is the
theory of droit moral, or moral rights theory.28 This theory recognizes the
20

COHEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
Id. For example, it is conceivable that the amount of time, energy, and cost it takes a musician to
write and record a song or a painter like Picasso to create one of his paintings is quite high. Reproducing
these works, however, is quite low. Someone can purchase a blank compact disc anywhere and make a
copy at home or make a photocopy of a painting at little or no cost to them. This is unlike real property,
where an owner can exclude others from using his property and by its very nature cannot be reproduced.
22
Id. at 7.
23
Id.
24
Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and
America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1015 (1990).
25
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Framers of the Constitution recognized the national interest in
the progress of knowledge and that this progress was accomplished through new creative works. Marci
A. Hamilton, The Historical and Philosophical Underpinnings of the Copyright Clause, 5 OCCASIONAL
PAPERS INTELL. PROP. FROM BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. L., YESHIVA U. at 12 (1999). Although
Congress receives its directive from the Constitution, many do not recognize this directive, viewing
copyright law merely as a form of trade regulation, and many textbooks do not even discuss the
Intellectual Property Clause. Id. at 13.
26
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); COHEN ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 7.
27
Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
28
See generally Ginsburg, supra note 24 (discussing the historical and modern perceptions of the
droit moral system and a comparison between the U.S. economic system and France’s droit moral
system).
21

Published by eCommons, 2010

92

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

personal rights of an author,29 which “inure to the artist as creator and which
protect the artistic integrity of the artist’s creation and require recognition of
the artist as author/creator.”30 Thus, some of these personal rights can
include the right to be known as the author (and preventing others from
naming her as the author for a work she did not create), the right to prevent
others from changing her work, and the right to control the dissemination of
a work.31 Except in limited, narrow circumstances, U.S. law does not
recognize moral rights in its copyright laws.32
Because the United States does not follow this moral rights theory,
copyright law is based on the Constitution’s economic-based system. The
current legislation, the Copyright Act of 1976, is codified in Title 17 of the
United States Code, Section 101 et seq.33 Congress is given broad discretion
to determine the breadth of copyright law (as the only directive is the
Intellectual Property Clause in the Constitution), and courts are reluctant to
extend protection too far without guidance from Congress.34 Under the
current structure, an author receives copyright protection for the life of the
author plus seventy years.35 Encompassed in this time period are an
author’s exclusive rights, which are granted in section 106 of the Act.36
29

NIMMER, supra note 16, at § 8D.01.
Geri J. Yonover, The “Dissing” of Da Vinci: The Imaginary Case of Leonardo v. Duchamp, 29
VAL. U. L. REV. 935, 947 (1995).
31
Id.
32
For instance, under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), an artist receives very limited moral
rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). Protection under VARA is given to certain visual works of art, and
two primary moral rights are given: the right of integrity and the right of attribution. Id.; Rikki Sapolich,
When Less Isn’t More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral Rights Model of Copyright Through a Study of
Minimalist Art, 47 INTELL. PROP. L. J. 453, 478-79 (2007). What does and does not qualify as a visual
work of art is defined in section 101 of the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Under VARA, an artist can claim
authorship of his work, prevent others from using his name in connection with a work, prevent distortion
or mutilation to a work that would harm his reputation, and prevent destruction of works with recognized
stature. Id. § 106A. For a more thorough discussion of moral rights and VARA and its shortcomings, see
Sapolich, supra, at 475-82. See also Rebecca Stuart, A Work of Heart: A Proposal for a Revision of the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 to Bring the United States Closer to International Standards, 47 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 645 (2007) (discussing VARA, its problems, and proposed amendments to harmonize
American moral rights law with international law). For the courts’ perception of VARA, see Carter v.
Helmsey-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the application of VARA and the exclusion
of protection to works made for hire to a sculpture located inside a commercial building); Martin v. City
of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing VARA’s stature requirement and application to
a sculpture). In addition to a visual artist receiving moral rights under section 106A of the Act, an
author may be able to receive moral rights under contract principles or the Lanham Act’s unfair
competition cause of action. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding
Monty Python’s copyrighted work had been infringed by defendant’s editing of the material for
broadcast in the United States on both contract and Lanham Act claims). Finally, the attempts of some
American authors to claim moral rights abroad in countries where those rights are recognized have been
quite difficult. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, French High Court Remands Huston Colorization Case, 39
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 252 (1992) (discussing the attempt of Anjelica Huston to receive moral
rights protection for her father’s movie The Asphalt Jungle in France).
33
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332.
34
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). This reluctance
likely stems from the overall goal of copyright law to create a balance between providing incentives to an
author and incentives to the public.
35
17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
36
Id. § 106.
30
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These rights include the right to reproduce and distribute the work, the right
to create derivative works, the right to display the work, and the right to
perform the work.37 If copyright law is compared to real property law, these
rights serve as the fence that keeps others out of the “copyright house,” or
they define what level of protection a copyright owner will receive. This
“so-called bundle of rights . . . may overlap in some cases.”38 The copyright
owner can either exercise these rights personally or authorize others to
exercise them on his or her behalf.39
If the bundle of rights granted to an author is the fence, then there
are three “front door” issues a work must meet before an author can enter
the copyright house and receive protection. In order to receive protection, a
work must be 1) an “original work[] of authorship,” 2) “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression,” and 3) must be a non-idea.40
The first requirement, originality, only requires that the work be
original to the author.41 Although “work of authorship” is not defined in
section 101 of the Act, it has been defined by the Supreme Court as “he to
whom anything owes its origin . . . .”42 Furthermore, some guidance is also
provided in section 102 of the Act. Under section 102, a variety of works of
authorship are protected, including: literary works; musical works; dramatic
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; motion pictures; sound recordings; and architectural
works.43 This list, however, is nonexhaustive.44 Originality is also not
defined in the statute,45 but it is well settled that originality does “not include
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit . . . .”46 The definition
of originality is meant to be broad, and the law is not intended to exclude
new technologies simply because they are new.47
Courts have since taken this broad perception of originality and held
it to a very low standard, requiring only that the “work [be] independently
37

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976).
39
17 U.S.C. § 106.
40
Id. § 102.
41
Id. § 102(a); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
42
See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
43
17 U.S.C. § 102. Only four of these categories are defined in section 101. Id. § 101. When
enacting the statute, Congress presumed that the three undefined categories have well-settled meanings.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976).
44
Congress did not intend to limit the ways in which an author can express himself, nor did
Congress intend to “freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter . . . or to allow unlimited expansion
into areas completely outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 implies neither that that
subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression within that general area of subject matter
would necessarily be unprotected.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51.
45
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
46
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476. These characteristics are the subject matter of a patent. See Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1951). For the statutory authority for
patents, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
47
See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
38
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created by the author . . . and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity.”48 Furthermore, a work can be original “even though it closely
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of
copying.”49 A court will not judge originality or the medium in which a
work is portrayed, as that would allow judges to make their own decisions
based on the merits of the work, rather than acting objectively.50 As long as
this low standard for originality is met, a work will receive copyright
protection.51
If an author takes elements from the public domain (i.e.
unprotectable elements) and adds something to those elements (i.e. his own
creative elements) to make it different or a distinguishable variation, then he
will receive copyright protection for that new work.52 Under the required
standard of originality, two people could create the same work and both of
them would receive protection, providing both establish independent
creation.53
The second requirement for copyright protection, that a work be
fixed in a tangible medium of expression,54 is defined in section 101 of the
statute as something that is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration.”55 Furthermore, “it makes no difference what the
48

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Id. In essence, all that is required is “little more than . . . copying.” Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103.
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-51 (1903).
51
Certain categories of protected works may require a more focused analysis. When a photograph is
the copyrighted work, for instance, the originality requirement may be different than an originality
analysis for work such as a sculpture, song, or novel. Photographs were first extended copyright
protection in 1884, where a court recognized a photographer can choose the setting, arrangement,
lighting, etc. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60. Currently, there are three different ways a photograph can
meet the requisite originality standard. First, an author can meet the originality requirement by choosing
the angle of the photo, the lighting and shading, and the exposure, or originality in the rendition, as the
“copyright protects not what is depicted, but rather how it is depicted.” Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.
377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Second, a photograph may be original because of the timing;
this is simply a case of being in the right place at the right time as the underlying subject matter is not
within an author’s copyright. Id. at 453. Finally, a photo may be original in the creation of the subject,
where the photo is original to the “extent that the photographer created ‘the scene or subject to be
photographed.’” Id. If an artist meets this originality standard he may prevent others from taking that
exact photo and recreating it in another medium because in essence the copyright extends to the subject
of that photo. Id. at 454. For a discussion on the impact technology has on the copyrightability of
photographs, see John Gastineau, Note, Bent Fish: Issues of Ownership and Infringement in Digitally
Processed Images, 67 IND. L.J. 95 (1991).
52
Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 104-05.
53
Independent creation is always a defense to a copyright infringement claim. COHEN ET AL., supra
note 16, at 323-24.
54
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
55
Id. § 101. In essence, as soon as an author puts his novel on paper or an artist paints a bowl of
fruit, for example, this requirement is satisfied, as the work in question can be perceived in a tangible
form. Even the audiovisual aspects of a video game have been found to meet the fixation requirement.
Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982). For instance, in Williams
Electronics, Inc., the defendant challenged plaintiff’s copyright, claiming the video game creates new
images every time the game is played and the player has a role in the creation of individual games so as
to become the “co-author of what appears on the screen,” barring the plaintiff from receiving copyright
protection. Id. at 873-74. The court rejected these arguments, holding that while the images are “new”
49
50
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form, manner, or medium of fixation may be . . . whether it is capable of
perception directly or by means of any machine or device ‘now known or
later developed.’”56
The final requirement, that the work cannot be an idea, is not a
positive requirement like originality and fixation, but rather a negative
requirement.57 Thus, in order for a work to receive protection, it cannot be
an “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”58 One of these
limitations, the idea/expression dichotomy, states that copyright law does
not protect ideas themselves, only manifestations of those ideas.59 In
essence, there must be a distinction between the copyrighted work and the
underlying art it is intended to illustrate.60
For example, in the prominent case of Baker v. Selden, the
copyrightability of a book describing a new accounting system (which
contained a diagram of this system) was in question.61 The court held that a
copyright in the book would only extend to the description of that system;
the ledger itself was not protectable.62 Thus, when it comes to copyright
protection, there must be a distinction between the book and the art the book
intended to illustrate (i.e. copyright law would protect the book but not the
art explained in that book).63
The idea/expression dichotomy is not the only subject matter
doctrine that limits copyright protection.64 For instance, facts are not
copyrightable, as “facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.”65
each time the game is played, the original images do repeat themselves over and over and the images are
permanently embodied in the machine and memory itself. Id. at 874.
56
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976). The requirement for fixation is particularly helpful in an
infringement analysis because it gives an author proof that he created the work in question.
57
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
58
Id.
59
COHEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 72.
60
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
61
See id. at 100-01.
62
Id. at 107. This diagram would be the subject of a patent. Id. at 105. To award the author of the
book a copyright in the ledger itself would prevent anyone else from using the ledger, thus tilting the
balance too far in the copyright owner’s favor. See id. at 107. The author would have received protection
for not only patentable subject matter, but also protection for the overall “idea” of a ledger, which would
extend his monopoly too far. Thus, the line between ideas and expression can be quite finite and difficult
to determine is some cases.
63
See id. at 107. Thus, there are two purposes to section 102(b): finding the line between what is
protectable and what is in the public domain, and finding the line between copyrightable and patentable
works. COHEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 72.
64
There are also limitations to a copyright owner’s exclusive rights. For instance, everything in
section 106 is “‘subject to sections 107 through 118,’ and must be read in conjunction with those
provisions.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976). These statutory exceptions include the fair use
defense, use by libraries, certain types of performances, secondary broadcast transmissions, and
ephemeral recordings, among others. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (2006).
65
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). There is a distinction
between creation and discovery because the first person to find a fact has not himself created that fact,
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This holds true whether the facts are phone numbers66 or a work detailing
historical events.67 Although the facts themselves are not copyrightable, a
compilation of facts is protectable.68 This protection is in the underlying
expression only; others can copy the facts, just not the precise expression
used by the author.69 This is known as a “thin” copyright.70 Thus, even if a
work meets the requisite standards of originality and fixation, facts and
ideas themselves are not copyrightable, and other limiting subject matter
doctrines must be looked at in order to determine protectability.71 This is
the final hurdle an owner must overcome in order to receive copyright
protection.
B. The Fair Use Doctrine
As with general copyright protection, the doctrine of fair use began
as a common law affirmative defense to copyright infringement in the
eighteenth century with the Statute of Anne.72 This doctrine was adopted by
Congress in the 1976 Copyright Act.73
1. Definition, Purpose, and Justifications for Fair Use
Fair use can be raised by a defendant as an affirmative defense in a
copyright infringement suit.74 Initially a common law doctrine, a court first
only discovered its existence. Id. “The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘[n]o author
may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.’” Id. at 344-45.
66
See id. at 361.
67
“To avoid a chilling effect on authors who contemplate tackling an historical issue or event, broad
latitude must be granted to subsequent authors who make use of historical subject matter, including
theories or plots.” Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980). The court
takes this limitation a step further, stating research is not copyrightable. See id. at 979.
68
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. A compilation meets the requisite originality standard because of the
choices an author can make in creating a compilation. Id. at 348. Compilations are not copyrightable per
se, however, and there are three distinct elements that give a compilation copyright protection: “(1) the
collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or
arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or
arrangement, of an ‘original’ work of authorship.” Id. at 357.
69
Id. at 348.
70
See id. at 359.
71
One of the other limiting doctrines is the merger doctrine, which states that if there are only so
many ways to create a work, the idea and expression merge and that work is not copyrightable. But see,
e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s red book data was not excused by the merger doctrine). A second
limiting doctrine is scenes á faire, which is used for literary works and states certain plot elements,
characters, or settings are unprotectable because they are indispensable to the topic. See, e.g., Hoehling,
618 F.2d at 979 (holding plaintiff could not receive protection for certain elements of his book because
they were standard to his work on the history of the Hindenburg). A final common limiting doctrine is
the useful articles doctrine, which states articles that are useful do not receive copyright protection if the
design elements cannot be severed from the useful elements. But see, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954) (upholding plaintiff’s copyright in a statuette because the useful element, a light bulb, could be
removed from the statuette).
72
4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:1.50 (2009).
73
Id.
74
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). Once a prima facie case for infringement can be shown, the burden
shifts to the defendant to successfully raise a fair use defense. Christina Bohannan, Copyright
Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1099 (2010).
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recognized fair use in 1841, in Folsom v. Marsh.75 In Folsom, the court
stated a second author could use material from a copyrighted work as long
as the portions used were for fair and reasonable criticism; if he used the
work in a way that superseded the original, his use was considered
infringement and therefore a violation of copyright law.76 When Congress
enacted the 1976 Act, it codified the doctrine in section 107, with the
intention to simply adopt the common law doctrine as is.77 Thus, the
statute’s preamble states that works receive protection “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research . .
. .”78
Although fair use has been recognized since the late nineteenth
century, no concrete definition has ever been given.79 This has not been a
hindrance, however, because it requires a case-by-case determination of
whether a use is fair.80 The definition consistently given for fair use is that it
is a privilege given to people other than the copyright owner to use his
material, disregarding the monopoly given to the owner in that work.81
Thus, it limits the monopoly given to the original author and allows a
second author to legally use aspects of someone else’s work. Fair use
allows courts to avoid rigidly applying copyright laws to a work when
application of those laws would stifle creativity.82
The purpose or justification for granting this privilege to someone
other than the owner ties directly to the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution; allowing this use tilts the balance in favor of the public, thus
promoting the progress of the useful arts.83 For fair use to function, a
balance needs to be achieved that serves the public interest, and judges
should not be constrained too much by the statutory language.84 In order to
serve this purpose, courts “must occasionally subordinate the copyright
holder’s interest in a maximum financial return to the greater public interest
in the development of art, science and industry.”85

75

See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
78
17 U.S.C. § 107.
79
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
80
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
81
Id.; Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc. 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966).
82
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. Because of this flexibility, new ways of analyzing claims of fair use
have been proposed. One solution analyzes fair use with an emphasis on the facts, categorizing the case
within one of six broad interactive paradigms. Matthew W. Wallace, Analyzing Fair Use Claims: A
Quantitative and Paradigmatic Approach, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 121, 141 (1992). These
paradigms are to serve as a guide to a fair use claim and emphasize how to fit the facts into a particular
element of fair use so as to argue a stronger case. Id.
83
Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307.
84
PATRY, supra note 72.
85
Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307.
76
77
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2. The Statutory Factors
When Congress codified the fair use defense in the 1976 Act, four
factors were adopted to determine if a work would receive fair use
protection. The four factors include the purpose and character of use, the
nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality taken, and the
effect on the potential market.86 The four factors must be considered in the
totality of the circumstances and looked at and weighed together; they may
not be treated in isolation.87
a. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor goes to “the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes.”88 This factor relates to the common law principle of
looking to the “nature and objects of the selections made.”89 The preamble
of section 107 is closely tied to this factor, and this factor asks whether the
use was necessary for criticism or whether the purpose for the use would
have been served by using unprotectable elements such as facts and ideas.90
It requires a court to look at both the justification for a defendant’s work as a
whole as well as the justification for each individual use within that work.91
The court should examine whether the new work supersedes the original or
adds something new, thus making it transformative.92
There is a strong presumption that every commercial use of
copyrighted material is an unfair exploitation of an owner’s rights.93 The
commercial or nonprofit character of a work should be weighed against the
other factors, however, as a determination of the commercial nature of a
work should not be conclusive.94 The crux of this commercial versus
nonprofit distinction is not monetary gain but “whether the user stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price.”95 In addition to examining the commercial aspect of a
work, a court must also examine the purpose and character of the use.96
Relevant to the determination of the character of the use is “the propriety of
the defendant’s conduct.”97
86

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
89
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
90
PATRY, supra note 72, § 10:13.
91
Id.
92
Id. § 10:21.
93
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
94
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 76 (1976).
95
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
96
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
97
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. One category of use that derives commercial benefit but is still
considered fair under section 107 is parody because its primary purpose is comment and criticism and
87
88
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b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor looks to the nature of the copyrighted work,98 and
usually receives little attention.99 At common law, this factor examined the
“value of the materials used.”100 This factor is closely tied to the limiting
subject matter doctrines, as it “calls for recognition that some works are
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others.”101 There is
a greater need to disseminate works of a factual nature, ideas, or works
limited by one of the previously mentioned subject matter doctrines.102
Conversely, it is more difficult to establish fair use when the original work
is closer to the core of intended copyright protection.103 For example, in
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, the fair use defense was not applicable
because the underlying work was unpublished.104 Thus, the extent to which
copying will be permitted varies on a case-by-case basis.105
c. Amount and Substantiality Taken
The third factor examines “the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”106 Under the
common law doctrine, this factor dealt with the “quantity and value of the
materials used.”107 The focus for this factor is on the persuasiveness of a
potential infringer’s justification for using a pre-existing work, as well as the

has transformative value. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. For example, in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions, the defendant, a photographer, created a series of works “entitled ‘Food Chain Barbie,’ in
which he depicted Barbie in various absurd and often sexualized positions.” Mattel, Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003). These images depicted Barbie dolls with vintage
kitchen appliances, and the defendant actually used the word “Barbie” in some of his titles as well. Id.
The plaintiff, Mattel, filed an infringement action against the defendant, yet the defendant was able to
successfully defend his use by using the fair use doctrine. Id. at 797, 806. In regards to the defendant’s
purpose and character of use, the court held the transformative nature and parodic quality rebutted any
commercial aspect of the work, thus weighing in favor of the defendant. Id. at 803.
98
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
99
PATRY, supra note 72, § 10:138. This is evidenced by the little attention given to this factor in
legislative history and cases. Id. It has been suggested this lack of attention exists simply because the
significance of the factor is simple: whether or not the second use is transformative. See id. Despite this
lack of attention, this factor is important, as a determination of fair use for works that are transformative
requires a comparison between the copyrighted work and the infringing work. Id.
100
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
101
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
102
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563; see also supra note 71.
103
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
104
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564, 569. In Harper & Row, President Gerald R. Ford wrote a
memoir to be published by the plaintiff, who in turn granted Time Magazine the rights to provide an
excerpt from the book before it was published. Id. at 542-43. Before Time could publish the story,
however, the defendant published its own article, and Time subsequently cancelled its own article. Id. at
543. The plaintiff then brought a suit for copyright infringement. Id. Although important, the
unpublished nature of a work is not determinative. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Intl’l v. Henry Holt & Co.,
Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1502, 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding the unpublished nature of copyrighted
material does not preclude the fair use defense).
105
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563.
106
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
107
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
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quantity, quality, and importance of the materials used.108 Taking the heart
of a work is not acceptable, yet taking an insubstantial amount is not
excused simply because it is insubstantial, as the original author’s rights
would still be infringed by a second author’s copying.109
d. Effect on the Potential Market
The final factor looks to “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”110 As with the previous three
factors, this factor was also considered under common law.111 Courts
consider this factor to be the “single most important element of fair use”
because it demonstrates just how much the original work will be affected by
the defendant’s work.112 Under this factor, the market harm caused by the
actions of the alleged infringer and the impact on the potential derivative
market for the original must also be considered.113 In essence, courts
become concerned when the alleged infringer’s use serves as a market
substitution and could completely replace the original work.114
Once the copyright holder is able to establish a slight causal
connection between the infringement and a loss of revenue, the burden shifts
to the alleged infringer to show that damage would have been done
regardless of his use of the work.115 Furthermore, this factor should not be
construed too literally; if it were, almost every use would weigh against fair
use because, in theory, there is always the chance the copyright owner will
license in that particular market.116

108

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565. In essence, this factor requires a balancing of interests. For
example, in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, even though the defendant used a large
portion of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work, his use of the Barbie doll was not a verbatim copy, as parts of
the doll are not displayed in his photographs. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792,
803-04 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, while he did substantially make use of the dolls, he added new
elements the make the work his own. Id. at 804.
110
17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
111
See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349.
112
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
113
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568.
114
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
115
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567. It is important to note that a case of copyright infringement with
easy, clear-cut evidence of actual damage is very rare. Id. A defendant will very rarely outright say,
“yes, I copied the plaintiff’s work and should be punished.” If a defendant ever admits to copying it is
usually because he is raising an affirmative defense such as fair use or attempting to rebut the validity of
the plaintiff’s copyright.
116
PATRY, supra note 72, § 10:151. If the language of this factor were to be read literally, any
subsequent use by another author would be illegal, as the literal language of this factor would suppose
the original author has the right to all markets because there is the remote chance that this would happen.
It is possible that construing the language in this way would tilt the balance too far in the original
author’s favor by giving him more of a monopoly over his work and taking away future incentives to
create. Thus, in looking at this factor, courts must walk a fine line, as they do not want to restrict the
creation of future works but still want to allow an original author the opportunity to expand into future
markets.
109
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III. BACKGROUND ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”117 Thus, the Framers of the
Constitution sought to insure an individual’s freedom of speech, protecting
man’s need to express his opinions and the social need of the attainment of
truth.118 Initially, this Constitutional guarantee was simply to provide
protection from prior restraints,119 but the modern First Amendment doctrine
goes much farther, protecting both speech and expression.120
Because it is hard to determine the original intent of what the
Framers meant by “freedom of speech,”121 several free speech theories
developed to answer the “why” question of the First Amendment, yet there
is no single or universal theory.122 The three most recognized theories are
the market place of ideas theory, the human dignity and self-fulfillment
theory, and the democratic self-government theory.123
The first theory, the market place of ideas theory, argues that
protecting someone’s freedom of speech is essential for the discovery of
truth and creates an open market with competing ideas.124 Truth will emerge
from this competition of ideas; as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote,
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their

117

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (6th ed. 1941).
Norvell, supra note 16, at 551. The First Amendment was “a reaction against the suppression of
speech and of the press that existed in English society,” as until 1694 only works with a governmentgranted license were authorized for publication. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1205 (3d
ed. 2009). The second widely-accepted reason for enacting the First Amendment was the framers’
reaction to the law of seditious libel in England “that made criticizing the government a crime;” it was
believed that the King was above public criticism. Id. Unfortunately, truth was not a defense to this
crime and may have made things worse because it would damage the image and reputation of the
government. Id. at 1206. Ironically, shortly after the Constitution was ratified, Congress, along with
many of the drafters of the Constitution, voted to pass the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which
“prohibited malicious publication of defamatory material against the government, the Congress, or the
President.” Norvell, supra note 16, at 552.
120
Norvell, supra note 16, at 553. Ultimately, however, deciding what qualifies as protected speech
is up to the courts, and the Supreme Court has never followed the absolutist view that all government
regulation of speech should be prohibited. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 119, at 1207. As one notable
scholar has pointed out, “[l]ine drawing is inevitable as to what speech will be protected under the First
Amendment and what can be proscribed or limited.” Id.
121
1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:2 (2003). For
instance, the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts probably adds to this confusion, as the First
Amendment was a reaction to the harsh sedition law in England. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 119, at 1206.
122
SMOLLA, supra note 121, § 2:3.
123
Id.
124
Id. § 2:4.
118
119
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wishes safely can be carried out.”125
The second theory, the human dignity and self-fulfillment theory,
focuses on the importance of free speech to a human being.126 This theory
advocates that it is important to protect someone’s equality and autonomy
when protecting a constitutional right such as the freedom of speech.127
Finally, the third theory, the democratic self-government theory,
proposes freedom of speech exists because it is essential to democracy.128
This sort of open discussion is essential for people to make informed
decisions in elections and gives people the option to express their views and
opinions on public policy.129 In other words, the freedom of speech exists to
serve as a check on the government.130 It has been argued that political
speech fits perfectly into this First Amendment protection.131
Regardless of why freedom of speech is seen as a fundamental right,
early scholars recognized that the First Amendment was “not intended to
give immunity for every possible use of language.”132 One such limitation is
provided by the common law doctrine of defamation, which has a particular

125

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). This theory has been
strongly criticized, as some argue there is no guarantee that truth will prevail. See, e.g., Harry
Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale L.J. 1105, 1129-30 (1979). In response to the criticisms
raised by others, supporters argue that the alternative, allowing the government or some other smaller
group to determine what is true, is much worse. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 1.02(B), 1-12 (1984).
126
SMOLLA, supra note 121, § 2:5.
127
See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-51 (1989).
128
SMOLLA, supra note 121, § 2:6.
129
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255-56
(1961).
130
See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 523 (discussing the various ways the First Amendment serves as a check on the
government).
131
Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26-27
(1971). Scholars disagree on whether political speech should be the only type of speech protected by the
First Amendment. Arguments for this limited protection claim speech regarding how we are governed,
rather than scientific, educational, commercial or literary speech should be protected. Id. at 28. It is
claimed this approach will free the courts from stifling obligations. Id. at 28-29. However, arguments
against limited protection conclude it would be almost impossible to define political speech, and it would
lead to a world where any speech not concerning the government would not be protected. SMOLLA, supra
note 121, § 2:6.
132
CHAFFEE, supra note 118, at 15 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes). Two other First
Amendment principles that are influential on the freedom of speech are the free speech method, which
organizes the approaches to free speech jurisprudence and attempts to resolve free speech problems, and
the free speech doctrine, which incorporates the tests and formulations that govern the freedom of
speech. SMOLLA, supra note 121, §§ 2:9, 2:13. A complete discussion of all of these tests is beyond the
scope of this comment, but can include subject matters such as obscenity (see Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) for the modern obscenity standard), commercial speech (see Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) for the often-cited test for
when the government can regulate commercial speech), and conduct that communicates (see U.S. v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) for a test regarding when the government can regulate this type of speech).
For an overview of the various facets of the modern First Amendment doctrine, see Norvell, supra note
16.
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relationship to the First Amendment.133 Generally speaking, a claim for
defamation requires a plaintiff to show his or her reputation was injured
because of a false statement made by the defendant.134 This speech is
essentially false speech, and until 1964, courts left the First Amendment out
of defamation analyses because of this categorization.135
In 1964, however, the Supreme Court constitutionally limited the
law of defamation with New York Times v. Sullivan.136 In this pivotal case,
the Court required a higher standard of proof when a defamatory statement
was about a public official.137 When a defendant makes an alleged
defamatory statement, his privilege only extends to opinions based on
facts.138 The Court recognized that this concept is related to the First
Amendment freedom of speech (particularly when dealing with public
officials), and this constitutional safeguard is permitted to facilitate ideas,
views, and comments about changes desired by the people.139 In essence,
some sort of breathing space is needed when it comes to free speech in the
political atmosphere.
Based on this framework, the Constitution requires a higher
standard of proof when a statement is made about a public official: actual
malice is required.140 Actual malice is defined by the court as “knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”141
This higher standard of proof was extended in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
to include public figures.142 This standard does not, however, extend to
defamatory statements concerning private individuals.143

133

JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & M. STUART MADDEN, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 369
(3d ed. 2007).
134
Id. at 370.
135
Id. at 379.
136
Id.
137
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The defendant in this case
created an advertisement that claimed the plaintiff, a city commissioner, was involved in actions against
Civil Rights leaders. Id. at 256-58. Because of this new standard, however, the plaintiff was not
successful. Id. at 285-86.
138
Id. at 267.
139
Id. at 269.
140
Id. at 279-80.
141
Id. at 280. The requirement of actual malice does not create an absolute privilege to defame
public officials; rather, it only creates a qualified privilege. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 133, at 381.
142
See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967). Public figures are generally people who
have a role of special prominence in society, have positions of power or influence, and sometimes can
become a public figure through no fault of their own. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). In
Curtis v. Butts, for instance, the defendant published an article accusing the plaintiff, a football coach, of
conspiring to fix the result of a football game. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 135-36. Although the Court found the
plaintiff to be a public figure, the plaintiff had sufficiently proven actual malice to succeed on his
defamation claim. Id. at 154, 156-58.
143
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. This is because public figures and public officials have more access to
communicative channels and have a more realistic opportunity to rebut false statements. Private
individuals, on the other hand, are not provided that same opportunity and are more vulnerable to injury,
so the interest in protecting those individuals is greater. Id. at 344. In Gertz, the defendant accused the
plaintiff, an attorney, of having a criminal record and labeled him as a Communist, among other things.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Although a copyrighted work is essentially the “speech” of an
author, the underlying goals of the First Amendment and copyright law are
quite different. Many have argued a relationship between the two should be
formed (or have argued that it is also incorporated in copyright law in
certain areas), especially when a closer look reveals that the purposes of the
First Amendment and copyright law appear to be exact opposites.144
Regardless, there must be some sort of balance to reconcile these two
competing interests.
Despite the competing interests between the two doctrines, both
have principles that limit the scope of protection awarded, or principles that
are exceptions to the general rule. In the free speech context, this limitation
comes through the common law defamation principle of actual malice. In
the copyright context, this limitation is the defense of fair use. Due to the
underlying similarities in these limiting doctrines, the limiting doctrine
found in the freedom of speech could be applied to fair use so as to reconcile
these two contradictory principles.
A. The Relationship Between Copyright Law and the First Amendment
In the words of Benjamin Cardozo, “[t]he reconciliation of the
irreconcilable, the merger of antithesis, the synthesis of opposites, these are
the great problems of the law.”145 This holds true for the relationship
between the First Amendment and copyright law, as the underlying purposes
behind these two legal schemes are quite different. Copyright law, for
instance, was initially enacted to encourage censorship, prevent unlawful
copying, and provide tools for the government’s control.146 Unlike
copyright law, the First Amendment seeks to maintain freedom and
Id. at 325-26. Because the plaintiff was found to be a private person, no higher standard of proof was
required, and the court found proof of defamation in his favor. Id. at 352.
144
Some of these authors include Alan E. Garfield, The Case for Frist Amendment Limits on
Copyright Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169 (2007) (discussing the First Amendment limits on copyright);
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970) (discussing how
copyright monopolies conflict with the First Amendment and proposing two solutions through copyright
infringement to reconcile this conflict); Henry S. Hoberman, Copyright and the First Amendment:
Freedom or Monopoly of Expression?, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 571 (1987) (arguing a principled formulation
should be created to the disjointed current approach to copyright law and the First Amendment);
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001) (reviewing the history
of this relationship and arguing for a balance approach); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the presence of the First
Amendment in the fair use defense); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970) (arguing the relationship
originates from the idea/expression dichotomy). Some of the more notable approaches, as well as some
of the more unconventional approaches, are discussed within this section. These two doctrines can be
considered opposites because the fundamental purpose of copyright law serves to protect an author’s
rights in his work, or “speech,” and to provide a monopoly over certain information, while the First
Amendment seeks to disseminate as much speech as possible.
145
Nimmer, supra note 144, at 1180.
146
COHEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 19.
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dissemination of speech.147 Thus, the question becomes how these two
constitutional doctrines can be reconciled and coexist together.
Commentators and courts have addressed this question in a variety
of ways, and there are five generally accepted views on how to reconcile
copyright law and the First Amendment.148 First, it has been advocated that
because Congress has the power to enact copyright law from the Intellectual
Property Clause, how could those laws be unconstitutional when the power
to enact them comes from the Constitution itself?149 The second theory is
that the First Amendment is built into the principle of the idea/expression
dichotomy, as copyright law only protects the expression (rather than the
ideas) of an author.150 Third, it has been argued that the idea of freedom of
speech is built into the fair use defense, as it allows others to use the
expression of a copyrighted work.151 Fourth, it has been argued that the
economic incentive to create copyrightable works “maximize[s] overall
production of valuable speech.”152 Finally, the fifth theory relies on
principles of property law, and under this theory it has been argued that
copyrighted works are private property and “there is no First Amendment
right to steal.”153
The Supreme Court has addressed the conflicting doctrines of
copyright law and the freedom of speech with the conclusion that one is
interrelated and connected to the other. For instance, in the Court’s eyes,
because the Intellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment were
adopted at roughly the same time, the Framers conceived that the limited
monopoly granted to a copyright owner was compatible with free speech
147

Nimmer, supra note 144, at 1188.
Many of the somewhat unconventional views also stem from these general areas, expanding,
critiquing, or narrowing the principles and ideas developed in the general areas.
149
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 12
(2002). As the author points out, this theory is rarely advocated because it confuses the relationship
between powers and rights, as the power to create these rights would still be subject to the First
Amendment. See id. at 12-13.
150
Id. at 12. This principle insures there is no restriction on the freedom of speech because only the
physical expression of someone’s idea is protected rather than the idea itself. Id. at 13-14. Others have
the freedom to copy an idea, they simply cannot copy the physical manifestation of that idea. Id. This
approach, while logical, is on its face quite vague and leaves questions open as to how it can be
implemented. Sometimes it can be a very difficult, open-ended question on how to determine what is the
idea and what is the expression of the author.
151
Id. at 16. This argument has been criticized, as, “[f]air speech is not free speech.” Id. at 18.
Furthermore, as many commentators have pointed out, there are a variety of ways to use this theory to
harmonize fair use and the First Amendment. See, e.g., supra note 144. Further clarification is needed
for this approach to be effective.
152
Rubenfeld, supra note 149, at 21. Despite the limited monopoly granted to a copyright author,
this theory argues that this limited monopoly is necessary to get the incentive to create, which leads to an
increase in the freedom of speech. Id. While this theory rationally makes sense, it could be argued that it
creates the same problems of trying to reconcile the differences in copyright law and the First
Amendment, as it relies on the underlying principles of copyright monopolies.
153
Id. at 24. This theory supposes that because there is a natural property claim to a copyrighted
work and property laws are enforceable without any influence from the First Amendment, copyright law
should be enforceable without any influence from the First Amendment. Id. at 25. On the surface, this
theory ignores the tangible differences between real property and intellectual property.
148
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principles.154 After all, both the First Amendment and the Intellectual
Property Clause are in a single document, the Constitution, and the Court
has pointed out the similar objectives between the two doctrines: the
creation and dissemination of information.155 As such, copyright law is the
“engine of free expression,” as it encourages people to continue to create
new forms of expression in any way possible.156 The Court has also
acknowledged what it sees as copyright law’s built-in First Amendment
accommodations, such as the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
defense.157
The question of how to reconcile the constitutional doctrines of
copyright law and the First Amendment has been addressed by many
commentators and scholars through the years. Two leading copyright
scholars have adapted and argued two of the most generally accepted
propositions reconciling the First Amendment and copyright law: the
idea/expression dichotomy theory and the fair use defense theory. Melville
Nimmer, for instance, has addressed this relationship, arguing that the
Intellectual Property Clause cannot be read independent of, and uncontrolled
by, the First Amendment.158 He advocates that some sort of balance needs
to be struck, or one needs to find a line where speech that is protected by the
First Amendment coincides with speech that may be prohibited by copyright
law.159 To Nimmer, this balance can be reached through the idea/expression
dichotomy.160 He cautions, however, in distinguishing fair use from the
First Amendment because these two principles are quite different in
nature—the First Amendment can be used even when the marketability of a
work has been affected, yet fair use considers the commercial effect a copy
has on an original work.161
Conversely, Neil Netanel, another leading scholar, has argued that
the key to reconciling the First Amendment and copyright law can be found
by modifying the fair use doctrine.162 This view stems from his conclusion
that copyright law is a type of content-neutral regulation that is dealt with
through First Amendment principles.163 The modifications proposed by
Netanel are substantive in nature, involve the burden of proof, and focus on
remedies.164 He first argues that more weight should be given to the
154

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
Id. at 243-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1989).
157
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (majority opinion).
158
Nimmer, supra note 144, at 1182.
159
Id. at 1185.
160
Id. at 1192. Consistent with the generally accepted approach to this theory, ideas would fall on
the side of free speech while the expression of that idea would fall on the side of copyright law. Id. at
1190.
161
Id. at 1200-01, 1203-04.
162
Netanel, supra note 144, at 83.
163
See id. at 54-69.
164
Id. at 83.
155
156
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defendant’s “critical expression and purpose,” and then he argues that the
burden of proof should shift to the plaintiff to show both that the defendant
copied more than necessary and that this copying could harm the copyrightholder’s market.165 Finally, he proposes a new system for remedies given to
injured plaintiffs, arguing that when defendants cannot successfully defend
on fair use, courts should award a licensing fee to the plaintiff rather than
enjoining the use.166
There have also been a variety of other arguments—some more
unconventional than others—set forth to reconcile the two doctrines of
copyright law and the First Amendment.167 One author, for instance, argues
the actual malice standard developed in New York Times v. Sullivan should
be applied to a fair use defense when moral rights are implicated in the
copyrighted work.168 In essence, the actual malice standard would allow an
artist (plaintiff) to recover under a moral rights theory if the defendant’s fair
use was knowingly false or done with reckless disregard for the truth.169
This author argues that the actual malice standard is appropriate because it is
used under the First Amendment when a public figure is involved, and an
artist is like a public figure in that she opens herself to criticism and
acknowledges the reputation that an artist can obtain in her community.170
Arguably, this application of the actual malice standard is applicable under
the fair use defense because both the actual malice and the fair use defense
promote public discourse and preclude the dissemination of false
information.171 Thus, under this approach, the defendant must disprove that
the plaintiff is a public figure, and then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to show fair use was committed with actual malice to determine if an artist’s
moral rights trump another author’s fair use of the work.172
A second rather unconventional approach to the relationship
165

Id.
Id. at 84.
167
For an example of a more “conventional” argument, see Bohannan, supra note 74 (advocating the
need for a harm requirement in copyright law—the same harm requirement as other speech-regulating
laws—so that all uses of copyrighted material are protected, except where there would be harm to
copyright’s statutory and constitutional purpose).
168
In the United States, this situation would arise when an artist has created a work that would
receive protection under VARA. See supra note 32.
169
Mark A. Petrolis, Comment, An Immoral Fight: Shielding Moral Rights with First Amendment
Jurisprudence when Fair Use Battles with Actual Malice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 190,
214 (2008).
170
Id. at 212. Under this approach, a plaintiff is automatically presumed to be a public figure, so a
defendant must first disprove this fact, because if the plaintiff is not a public figure actual malice would
not apply and fair use would overcome a claim of moral rights. Id. This approach will allow recovery
under an actual malice/moral rights theory without destroying the fair use defense. Id. This argument is
plausible, it is argued, because moral rights (for which protection is provided under VARA for authors of
visual art) are designed in part to protect an artist’s reputation. Id.
171
Id. To see some of the concerns raised by this application, see id. at 212-13. This approach
construes the overall structure and purpose of copyright law too closely related to moral rights, which is
not protected in the United States as a universal right. Caution should be used when applying this
approach because of its closeness to this non-U.S. theory of protection.
172
Id. at 214-15.
166
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between fair use and the First Amendment again uses the actual malice
standard, noticing the similarities between copyright law and the approach
taken in New York Times v. Sullivan. In this approach, a more difficult
standard of proof could be required for plaintiffs when the infringing work
contributes to important First Amendment values (similar to the way
defamatory speech could when it concerns public officials and public
figures).173 Through this approach, the substantial similarity requirement
found in an infringement analysis would be a constitutionally implied, more
rigorous standard.174 This approach is particularly advocated when thin
copyrights are at issue, as a heightened similarity requirement is already
implied in those cases.175 This First Amendment “thin” analysis could open
up more First Amendment protection for certain authors who wish to use an
already copyrighted work, even when such use is non-transformative, a
requirement found under the fair use doctrine.176 Under this approach, when
a work contains speech on “matters of public concern,” it is considered
highly protected First Amendment speech that will trigger the thin analysis
inspired by the actual malice doctrine.177
B. Moving Towards a More Fair Standard
In order to reconcile the two competing doctrines of copyright law
and the First Amendment, a new application of the principles developed in
New York Times v. Sullivan may be necessary. While the theories that have
been advocated by prior commentators are logical, more focus should be
provided on how to apply this constitutional standard. Both copyright law
and the First Amendment are quite expansive legal principles, so a very
narrow focus is required to efficiently implement a theory. Under the
173
Matthew Bunker, Adventures in the Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Absence of Independent First
Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273, 295 (2009).
174
Id. This standard would require a higher degree of similarity between the two works when the
second author is using the underlying work as protected speech and would also apply to works that were
not verbatim copies. Id. at 296. While this argument has the potential for success, it would likely
increase the already difficult copyright infringement case, which may have the adverse effect of tilting
that ever important balance too far in a certain direction.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 296-97.
177
Id. at 298-99. Other scholars have examined the relationship between the First Amendment and
copyright law by using transformative uses. For instance, one scholar looked at the role of the Press
Clause in transformative uses in arguing a change should be made to copyright law. C. Edwin Baker,
First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 941 (2002). If the Press Clause exists to
protect “the process of providing independent and diverse sources of information and vision,” then some
sort of privilege for transformative uses is needed. Id. at 942. This privilege should allow diverse,
dissenting, or non-mainstream expression to be heard, rather than stifle or censor it (the example the
author provides is someone taking the character Harry Potter and creating a tale such as “Harry Potter:
The Axe Murderer”). Id. at 941-42. A somewhat different approach to this type of copyrighted work
looks at appropriation art. Appropriation art is defined as a type of art where artists take previously
created photographs or other forms of visual media and create their own interpretation and social
commentary with those images, while still allowing the original work to be recognizable. Patricia Krieg,
Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1565 (1984). It has been argued that
this type of art should be protected under the First Amendment as a political statement or protecting it
under the marketplace of ideas theory. Id. at 1577-81.
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standard developed in the aforementioned case, there is a higher standard of
proof required for a plaintiff to be successful on a claim of defamation. If a
plaintiff is a public figure or a public official, then proof of actual malice
(knowledge or reckless disregard to the truth) is required, as freedom of
speech allows people to comment or criticize public figures or officials.178
Arguably, the fair use defense found in copyright law serves the same
purpose, as it allows a second author to legally copy someone else’s work
for the purposes of comment and criticism.
Perhaps applying the higher burden of proof found under actual
malice to instances where the fair use defense is raised will harmonize
copyright law and the First Amendment. To achieve this end, it is probably
not necessary to amend section 107 of the Act. Instead, this approach would
require a court, judge, attorney, or anyone else analyzing a fair use claim to
consider First Amendment principles in the totality of the circumstances,
which is often used in a fair use balancing. This will serve as a limiting
function and should be taken into account when analyzing the first two
factors: the purpose and character of the use and the nature of the
copyrighted work.179
This application should be very narrow, so as not to disrupt the
necessary balance in copyright law, applying only to instances where an
image of a public official is used. Thus, the application proposed applies
only in instances where the alleged infringing work depicts an image of a
public official.180 In essence, when an image of a public official is used, a
heightened analysis favoring the defendant is necessary.181 The analytical
process would become overwhelming if the category of protected works was
not limited—if there was no limit where would the line be drawn? The
potential infinite protection given to a copyright author if no line is drawn

178

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 283 (1964).
There are other proposals that have taken a similar approach to modifying fair use without
amending the Act. See, e.g., Tara M. Warrington, Harry Potter and the Doctrine of Fair Use: Conjuring
a New Copyright Complaint, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 621 (2009) (arguing a change in the complaintdrafting process which requires the plaintiff alleging facts that the infringing use is not fair can reconcile
the First Amendment with copyright law). After all, other factors, such as the published or unpublished
status of a work or a work’s parodic nature, are considered in a fair use analysis.
180
It should be noted that in instances such as these, the public official or figure is usually bringing
the claim against the unlawful user of her image. Known as the right of publicity, each person has the
right to “control and profit from the publicity values which he has created or purchased.” Melville B.
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954). In the Obama HOPE
poster issue, for instance, the usual application of the actual malice doctrine would occur if President
Obama himself brought a claim against Shepard Fairey for his use of his image, rather than the
Associated Press bringing a claim for appropriation of their copyright in a photograph. For an example
of a celebrity asserting such rights, see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003)
(discussing professional golfer Tiger Woods’ case against a sports artist for his use of Tiger’s image in a
painting commemorating the 1997 Masters Tournament).
181
This does not mean that the specific actual malice test should be applied, but rather that the
underlying purpose and principles behind that standard should be applied in these situations.
179
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would severely upset the delicate balance copyright law must meet.182
By limiting the analysis to images of a public official, more
protection is given to a secondary author who uses the image for purposes of
comment or criticism, which are two principles of fair use. Fair use is
particularly suited for this application because the defense itself is not a
bright line test and already allows for flexibility in the way the four factors
are applied to each situation where the defense is raised. This analysis will
be particularly important in the first two factors of fair use: the purpose and
character of the use and the nature of the copyrighted work. After all, if
courts can consider the unpublished nature of a work so as to grant more
protection to the copyright author, it is plausible that the scale can be swung
in the other direction to protect a defendant in a copyright suit if his use is
particularly suited to First Amendment principles of comment, criticism, and
the dissemination of information.
A number of justifications for applying this limiting First
Amendment principle to the limiting doctrine of fair use can be provided.
First, the approach taken in New York Times v. Sullivan asks a court to go
through a balancing test in determining if potentially defamatory speech is
allowed.183 A court is to ask first whether the plaintiff is a public official,
and then to ask whether the defendant made his allegedly defamatory
statement with actual malice. This determination of actual malice can be
seen as a balancing approach to help determine which speech would be
protected by the First Amendment and which speech would not be protected
speech, the former being speech that passes the actual malice test.
Similarly, the fair use defense is a balancing test to determine whether
unauthorized use of copyrighted material is allowed, and if the material
“passes” the factors found in fair use, the defendant would be allowed to
legally use the copyrighted work. Clearly, these two tests are quite similar,
so an application of the principles found in the actual malice could logically
be applied to the fair use defense.
A second justification involves the purpose of each doctrine. The
purpose of the actual malice doctrine in First Amendment law serves a
limiting function: it protects the freedom of speech by limiting a plaintiff’s
ability to stop potentially defamatory speech. Likewise, the fair use defense
limits a copyright owner’s monopoly over his copyrighted material. By
applying the actual malice doctrine to copyright law in limited instances,
where the copyright in question is an image of a public official, copyright
law and the First Amendment can be harmonized. This harmonization is
182
If this approach is not limited to a narrow category of works, any second user could claim fair use
through the First Amendment. Without limits, every second user could be successful with this defense,
severely weakening the rightful author’s limited monopoly. This could discourage future authors, which
would then slowly erode the delicate balance the Intellectual Property Clause establishes.
183
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281.
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justified because both doctrines have similar purposes.
The purpose behind the actual malice doctrine can also play another
role in justifying the application of those principles to copyright law. As
stated in New York Times v. Sullivan, there is a need to allow for more
political speech.184 The democratic system encourages this political speech
and wishes to allow criticism of public officials to further these goals.
Because a copyrighted work is a type of speech, the conclusion follows that
copyrighted works can be used to make a political statement. A political
statement could include an artistic depiction of a public official. Similarly,
the purpose of the fair use defense is to allow for comment and criticism, the
same goals that were stated by the Supreme Court in regards to the First
Amendment. Thus, it logically follows that these First Amendment
principles could be applied to the fair use doctrine when the copyrighted
material at issue depicts a public official and could be perceived as a form of
political speech. The fair use defense could be used in this way to
constitutionally allow First Amendment protection under copyright law.
A final justification that could be given for this approach centers on
existing scholarship. As many scholars point out, it is a generally accepted
principle that fair use is one way in which the First Amendment and
copyright law can be reconciled.185 Extending (or in a way narrowing) this
idea to only include copyrighted works containing images of public officials
is not as “off-base” because this link is already widely accepted. By
limiting this application to one, narrow category of use, the balance of
copyright law and the freedom of speech is not upset. It is possible that this
approach may be an even closer way to harmonize two constitutional
doctrines.
An example of how this approach could be effective is seen in the
issues surrounding the Obama HOPE campaign posters created by Shepard
Fairey. In this instance, Fairey took an image owned by the A.P. of
President Barack Obama and created his own interpretation: a drawing of
the President in a similar pose using only three colors with the word
“HOPE” inscribed on the poster.186 The legality of Fairey’s use is in
question, and while Fairey could claim fair use as a defense, there is still a
chance his use could be found infringing on the A.P.’s copyright,
particularly because he pulled the image from the internet after performing
an image search using Google.187
Fairey’s particular form of speech, however, could be seen as
something political in nature with the underlying purposes of comment and
184
185
186
187
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criticism. Applying the fair use doctrine as is, this important aspect of the
HOPE poster may be lost. It is likely a court could find that Fairey took a
significant portion of the copyrighted work and affected the potential market
of the copyrighted work because of the commercial nature of the distribution
of the poster and the number of posters sold. Each of these facts could lead
a court to find that Fairey’s use was not protected by fair use.
If the First Amendment were applied through the copyright context
in this case as proposed above, however, the result may be different. Fairey
took an image of a public official and used it to create a political comment
on the presidential election. Because Fairey is using his work for comment
and criticism, his secondary work should receive more protection and not be
seen as infringement. This type of speech is the very thing the Supreme
Court wanted to protect when they decided New York Times v. Sullivan. By
applying First Amendment principles to this case through the fair use
defense, Fairey, and other artists like him, could receive protection for his
work while still allowing original copyright authors the chance to maintain
the monopoly over their works.
V. CONCLUSION
By adding the First Amendment to the fair use balancing approach,
more bona fide uses could be protected, furthering the overall goal of both
copyright law and the First Amendment. There are, of course, some
negative implications in this approach. For instance, how far is too far? As
one scholar argued, there are “those who note that while our system of
[more] protection has produced Britney Spears and Madonna, the Framers’
system of non-protection produced Beethoven, and that maybe, therefore,
the Framers were on to something . . . .”188 Some may also argue that the
balance between copyright law and the First Amendment is already
sufficient and there is no need to tweak the scales. Furthermore, no matter
which way the argument is framed, copyright infringement and the
argument of fair use are still based upon the unlawful taking of an original
author’s work. In a pure black and white world, the second author has done
something wrong. Thus, this proposed analysis may provide protection to a
second author who acted in bad faith or with an improper purpose.
While these concerns have merit, they are the very reason why
limiting this analysis to images of public officials and incorporating it into
the balancing approach is advocated. This analysis must be limited to a very
narrow category to address these concerns, and the application must be
limited to people who actually used an original work in good faith. By
applying a limiting First Amendment principle to the limiting copyright
principle of fair use, copyright law and the First Amendment can be
188

Lessig, supra note 144, at 1064.
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reconciled.
Under the current standard of fair use, Shepard Fairey might not
receive protection, even though his HOPE poster is quite different from the
original A.P. photograph. At the time of this writing, a trial date has been
set for March 2011, to resolve the case between Fairey and the A.P.189
Despite its unresolved status, other scholars have also recognized the
importance of this case.190 Perhaps, therefore, this is the perfect case to
make a change to copyright law and harmonize the relationship between
copyright law and the First Amendment.

189

Larry Neumeister, Trial Date Set in AP-Artist Dispute in NYC, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 24,
2010, available at 8/24/10 APWORLD 01:44:06. Unfortunately for the merits of the case, Fairey’s
original counsel, Stanford’s Fair Use Project, withdrew from the case in late 2009 due to misconduct by
Fairey: he deleted electronic files that related to which photograph he used to create the HOPE poster.
Anthony Falzone, FUP Withdraws From Fairey Case; Hope Remains, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET AND
SOC’Y (Nov. 13, 2009, 1:21 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6353. Moreover, Fairey created new
files to replace the deleted ones to make it look like a different photograph was used. Id. Fortunately,
there may still be hope for a fair use argument to prevail. In August of 2010, the judge refused to impose
sanctions against Fairey for this misconduct. Tom Ramstack, Judge Refuses to Sanction Artist Suing AP
in Copyright Dispute, ALL HEADLINE NEWS (Aug. 9, 2010, 5:32 PM), http://www.allheadlinenews.com/
articles/7019539227?Judge%20Refuses%20to%20Sanction%20Artist%20Suing%20AP%20in%20Copyr
ight%20Dispute. Finally, in an ironic twist, it has been reported that Fairey “is losing hope in President
Obama” and, in his opinion, the President’s “failure to keep campaign promises.” “Hope” Artist
Disappointed in President, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 25, 2010, at 10.
190
See, e.g., Jo-Na Williams, The New Symbol of “Hope” for Fair Use: Shepard Fairey v. The
Associated Press, 2 No. 1 LANDSLIDE 55, 60 (2009). In fact, one notable scholar has gone so far as to
say Fairey’s use was clearly fair and the case will be decided as such because the use was transformative
and clearly made a powerful political statement. PATRY, supra note 72, § 10:132.60.

Published by eCommons, 2010

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol36/iss1/4

